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CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY:
DANGEROUS AND HARMFUL, THOUGH
MAYBE NOT IRRELEVANT
Yoshiro Miwa
The view has been gaining widespread acceptance that corporate
officials and labor leaders have a "social responsibility" that goes be-
yond serving the interest of their stockholders or their members.
This view shows a fundamental misconception of the character and
nature of a free economy. In such an economy, there is one and
only one social responsibility of business-to use its resources and
engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays
within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and
free competition, without deception or fraud.... It is the responsi-
bility of the rest of us to establish a framework of law such that an
individual in pursuing his own interest is, to quote Adam Smith
again,
"led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part
of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it
was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest, he frequently
promotes that of the society more effectually than when he re-
ally intends to promote it. I have never known much good
done by those who affected to trade for the public good."'
INTRODUCTION
Professor Friedman's rebuttal to the social responsibility of cor-
porate directors came to mind when I received an invitation to partici-
pate in this conference. When I first encountered Professor
Friedman's position as an undergraduate in the late 1960s, my first
reaction was surprise. At that time, most Japanese economists agreed
that corporate directors have a fiduciary obligation that extends be-
yond their shareholders. For years I disagreed with Professor Fried-
man's argument, even though admittedly I did not completely
understand it.
Three decades have now passed since my initial exposure to Pro-
fessor Friedman's argument against corporate social responsibility,
t Professor, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. This Article is based on a
paper that the author presented at the Cornell Law Review's symposium on corporate
social responsibility. The author is grateful to Harvard Law School ProfessorJ. Mark Ram-
seyer for his insightful comments and suggestions.
1 MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPrrAISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962) (citation omitted).
1227
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
and I have changed my position. Today, whenever I face an argument
in support of "corporate social responsibility," I immediately respond
with several questions:
If businessmen do have a social responsibility other than making
maximum profits for stockholders, how are they to know what it is?
Can self-selected private individuals decide what the social interest
is? Can they decide how great a burden they are justified in placing
on themselves or their stockholders to serve that social interest? Is it
tolerable that these public functions of taxation, expenditure, and
control be exercised by the people who happen at the moment to
be in charge of particular enterprises, chosen for those posts by
strictly private groups? 2
Among the factors that shape corporate governance in general
and influence the decision-making processes of corporate directors in
particular is the legal system. Legal constraints on corporate decision
making have varied over time and between nations, and corporate di-
rectors in different countries often have different concerns, advocate
different policy initiatives, and draw different conclusions. Much like
the United States, Japan confronts the controversial issue of whether
corporate directors have obligations to corporate stakeholders other
than shareholders. Since at least the 1960s, commentators have sur-
rounded this topic with a constant refrain of "vague, result-oriented
conceptions of basic fairness and equity, as well as other, equally
value-laden terms like economic efficiency and reliance." 3
This Article focuses on corporate governance and the decisions
of directors in large Japanese firms. Specifically, it presents an over-
view of the Japanese corporate law framework, outlines the debate
over corporate social responsibility inJapan, and illustrates the impact
of corporate social responsibility in Japan. I conclude that the view
that corporate directors owe a duty to stakeholders other than share-
holders of their firms is dangerous and harmful, though maybe not
irrelevant-that is, unimportant, insignificant, meriless, or valueless.
Some readers inevitably will express surprise that I have decided
to promote the Japanese experience at a time when most people are
disappointed with the performance of Japanese companies, manage-
ment, government, and economy. Had I participated in a similar con-
ference a decade ago, however, I would have presented nearly the
same views. Skeptics who believe that the governance of large Japa-
nese firms is fatally flawed should recall that the so-called 'Japanese
system" bore, grew and allowed to flourish some ofJapan's most suc-
cessful companies, including Honda, ORIX, Panasonic, Seven-Eleven
2 Id. at 133-34.
3 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual Perspec-
tive, 43 U. ToRoNTo L.J. 401, 401 (1993).
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Japan, SONY, and Toyota. Moreover, Japan achieved its historic post-
war industrial success under this system. To be sure, the Japanese sys-
tem has had its failures, but the American system has had similar
failures as well.
Although this Article limits its analysis to the relationship be-
tween corporate social responsibility and Japanese firms, it applies
universally to firms worldwide. Most people overestimate the differ-
ences between corporate behavior and the legal framework in Japan
and those in other countries. The structure and conduct of Japanese
firms, as well as the applicable corporate law, are virtually identical to
their counterparts in the rest of the world. Similarly, as a nexus of
contracts among rational agents, a Japanese firm is much the same as
an American firm and generally behaves rationally.4 Like most firms
in the United States, Japanese businesses rarely remain poorly man-
aged for very long5 because most firms with weak management will
either dismiss their managers, improve their performance, or go out
of business.
I base this Article's argument on standard economic principles
that scholars apply universally to all economies. The fundamental fac-
tor that determines the form, character, and conduct of every com-
pany is the organization-specific human capital in the body of its
employees. Because this principle is not unique to Japan, this Article
supports the traditional doctrine: directors of public corporations owe
fiduciary duties to shareholders and shareholders alone. This is not to
suggest that crucial differences do not exist between the economies of
different countries. Rather, the existing differences are not the prod-
uct of any great differences in the basic underlying corporate struc-
ture. Nevertheless, as I have argued elsewhere, political debate and
academic research about Japan are riddled with misconceptions that
flow from inaccurate statements aboutJapan's economy.6 This Article
seeks to set the record straight.
It is true that requiring corporations to bear a social responsibil-
ity, provided it concerns simply a choice between feasible alternatives
under normal conditions, directly influences directors' conduct only
marginally. In other words, even if the law imposed such a responsi-
bility on corporations, its corresponding direct effect on firm's behav-
4 SeeJ. Mark Ramseyer, Columbian Cartel Launches Bid forJapanese Firms, 102 YAL L.J.
2005, 2020 (1993) ("Elementary notions of comparative advantage suggest that some firms
in any country will always be uncompetitive compared to firms in the same industry
elsewhere.").
5 See id. at 2019-20.
6 SeeYosHIRo MnvA, Fiims AND INDUSTRLk ORGANIZATION INJAPAN 8 (1996). For an
accurate discussion of the current Japanese economy, see id. at 8-16, which outlines five
misconceptions of that economy. It provides a beginner's guide to the study of Japan's
economy today.
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ior would be limited. The indirect effects of a mandatory corporate-
social-responsibility regime, however, would endanger a free market
economy. If the public-social-responsibility position were to achieve
the level of widespread acceptance in Japan that it held until very re-
cently, then it would indirectly but nevertheless seriously influence
corporate behavior and the decision making of directors.
Part I of this Article briefly introduces relevant provisions of the
Japanese Commercial Code. Part II outlines the theoretical founda-
tion of firms and organizations, and identifies the "controlling group"
in most large Japanese firms. Part III analyzes the roles of directors
and friendly shareholders and explains why they remain friendly. Part
IV first supposes that mandating corporate "social responsibility" is de-
sirable and then discusses how-and at what cost-society could en-
force such a requirement. Part V examines the goals that proponents
of corporate social responsibility pursue and asks whether those objec-
tives are obtainable. Using concrete examples, Part VI illustrates the
success that profit-maximizing policies have had in rewarding share-
holders of large Japanese firms (the residual claimants) generously.
Part VII presents a series of examples which show that corporate social
responsibility is dangerous and harmful, but maybe not irrelevant.
The conclusion offers some final thoughts.
I
A BRrEF OVERVIEW OF JAPANESE CORPORATE LAW
The Japanese Diet enacted the Sho-ho, or Commercial Code,
shortly before the turn of the century.7 The Diet revised the Commer-
cial Code, which the drafters modeled on Prussian law,8 after World
War II to reflect more closely U.S. commercial law.9 Despite these
postwar modifications, the Code remains more detailed and less flexi-
ble than its statutory counterpart in the United States.
The kabushiki kaisha, or public corporation, is the most popular
business form for both large and small Japanese businesses.10 It
shares many fundamental features with the prevailing U.S. corporate
form."1 Shareholders of Japanese public corporations are subject to
liability only to the extent of their capital contributions. 12 They gener-
7 See Kenzo Takayanagi, Historical Introduction to 1 THE COMMERCIAL CODE OF JAPAN
ANNOTATED ix, xxxiv (Codes Translation Comm., League of Nations Ass'n ofJapan 1931).
8 See id. at xxxi.
9 See ElliottJ. Hahn, An Overview of the Japanese Legal System, 5 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus.
517, 522 (1983).
10 SeeYuiuo YANAGIDA ET AL., LA-W AND INvESrMENT iN JAPAN 271 (1994).
11 See id.
12 See SH6H6 art. 200, para. 1, reprinted in 2 LAW Bu= uxrN SEMFS: JAPAN (EHS) atJA
49 (1997) [hereinafter SH5HO] (English translation).
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ally have one vote per share' 3 and usually can recover their investment
only by selling their shares. They exercise influence over corporate
management by holding shareholder meetings, which the Code re-
quires them to hold at least once a year.14 Shareholders also may hold
meetings at the request of the board of directors, 15 with court permis-
sion,16 and at the request of a group of shareholders that collectively
owns at least three percent of the firm's outstanding shares.17 The
Code requires a majority vote to pass shareholder resolutions unless
the resolution falls within a statutory exception or the firm's articles of
incorporation provide otherwise.' 8
The shareholders elect directors at their annual meeting 19 to
manage the corporation.20 Each director serves on the board for a
term that lasts no longer than two years,21 and shareholders can re-
move directors before their terms expire. 22 The Code vests broad stat-
utory authority in the board to manage the corporation. 23
Enumerated responsibilities of Japanese boards include convocation
of general shareholder meetings, 24 approval of transactions between
directors and the company,25 and financial reporting to auditors.26
Japanese corporate law does not require boards of directors to
delegate management authority to corporate officers. In Japan, indi-
viduals whom U.S. companies would consider "senior management"
are directors. The Code requires that Japanese boards of directors
appoint at least one "representative director" who has actual authority
to bind the corporation on certain enumerated issues.27 A duty of
care and a duty of loyalty govern the relationship between directors
and the firm, and a breach of either is grounds for a shareholder law-
suit.28 The board must monitor the activities of each individual direc-
13 See id. art. 241, para. 1.
14 See id art 234, para. 1.
15 See id. art. 231.
16 See id. art. 237, para. 2.
17 See i- art. 237, para. 1.
18 See id. art. 239, para. 1.
19 See id. art. 254, para. 1.
20 See i& art. 260, para. 1.
21 See id. art. 256, para. 1.
22 See id. art. 257, para. 1. Directors, however, can seek damages when removed with-
out cause. See id.
23 See id, art. 260.
24 See id. art. 231.
25 See id. art. 265, para. 1.
26 See id. art. 274, para. 2.
27 See id. art. 261.
28 In 1950, the Commercial Code incorporated the kabunushi daihyo sosho, or share-
holders' derivative suit. Oddly, the provision does not include a requirement that the rep-
resentative "fairly and appropriately" represent the shareholders' interests. For
comprehensive treatment of this provision, see Yoshiro Miwa, kabunushi daihyo sosho, in
YOSHIRO MVA ET AL., KAISHA-Ho No KmZAGAxU 151 (1998).
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tor, and the Code prohibits the board from delegating decision-
making authority on certain key issues to specific directors.29 Share-
holders also can petition a court to enjoin action by directors when
irreparable damage to the firm otherwise will result.30
II
WHO CONSTITUTES THE "CONTROLLING GROUP"?
My approach toward corporate behavior is along the nexus of
contract theory of the firm associated with Jensen and Mechling.3'
This theory does not emphasize the legal definition of a firm because
basing an analysis of a formal organization on its legal definition cre-
ates the risk of easily misidentifying "the effective boundaries of the
organization."3 2 AsJean Tirole has observed, the economist's contrac-
tual view of a long-term arrangement has "relatively little to do with
the legal definition of a firm. 33 The constraints that the law imposes
on firms are only one set of many limitations that restrict the decision-
making authority of corporate directors and managers.
Instead, the fundamental question that underlies any discussion
of corporate structure is the identification of those players that consti-
tute what Herbert Simon has called the "controlling group."3 4 In my
view, the employees usually constitute this key group, which has "the
power to set the terms of membership for all the participants" of the
organization.3 5 The reason for this view is that employees not only
invest specific human capital in the organization, but also select the
29 See SH6H6, supra note 12, art. 260, para. 2.
30 See id. art. 272.
31 See Michael C.Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure; 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
32 PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 20
(1992). Because a firm in the real world is just a legal fiction, the legal boundary of any
given firm usually does not coincide with the boundary used by the controlling group in
their decision making. A firm, for Coase in particular and economic analysis in general, is
a set of activities and agents within the boundaries given by the controlling group, which
hereafter will be referred to as the effective boundary. The basic factor that determines an
organization's controlling group is not capital ownership (shareholdings) or corporate fi-
nancing (loans, bonds, and so on) or its representative directors. Rather, it is the organiza-
tion-specific human capital accumulated in the body of employees. For this controlling
group, the legal boundary is only one of many constraints in the decision-making process
and may not significantly affect the intrafirm organization or interfirm relationships. The
inside-outside characterization of a firm, as described by Coase, depends on transaction
costs. Again, the legal definition necessarily does not affect the economic definition of a
firm. In this view, it is in the interest of even a firm owner-manager to be friendly to the
body of employees. Therefore, the question of whether the management is separated from
control is irrelevant.
33 JEAN TiRoLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 16 (1988).
34 HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 118 (1957).
35 Id. I decided against replacing the label "controlling group" with a more descrip-
tive term such as "managing group" or "administrative group" because doing so actually
would have led to greater confusion. As I explain in Part III infra, shareholders select
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directors and managers who serve as their representatives in operating
the company. Employees support the directors and senior manage-
ment only if the directors and senior managers make decisions that
generally are consistent with the employees' interests. Although man-
agers who control a firm's resources sometimes will try to pursue their
own interests at the expense of their investors, the dynamics of a free
market economy inevitably serve as an invisible hand to constrain
their self-serving decisions. In the end, managers also must act with
the investors' best interests in mind because "[t] hose [managers] who
promise the highest returns... will obtain the largest investments." 36
The stakeholders in an organization, such as friendly shareholders
and friendly lenders,37 therefore defer to the controlling group. 38
Once we have identified the body of employees as the controlling
group, we must then identify those factors that enable the employees
to further their interests and defend themselves from other stakehold-
ers, especially shareholders in the firm. To survive and flourish in
today's market, a firm must do more than merely "carry out routine
work steadily." Market competition demands that firms continuously
search for new business opportunities, acquire knowledge, pursue in-
novation,3 9 and accumulate a stock of human capital that can ensure
long-term development. This accumulation is a long-term process
that requires some assurance that the firm will not take any action in
the near future that drastically might devalue the accumulated human
capital. In turn, this guarantee requires the support of friendly
shareholders.
An effective accumulation process has four defining characteris-
tics. First, each participant makes a long-term investment in his own
human capital. Second, investors generally gear their investments to-
ward the particular organization. In other words, the skill is organiza-
tion-specific. Third, the team production process that Alchian and
Demsetz describe-namely, that the product is not a sum of the indl-
directors and senior managers on the basis of their support of present directors and the
controlling group.
36 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract in CORPORATE LAw
AN ECONOMIC ANALYsis 182, 185 (Lucian Arye Bebchuk ed., 1990). Easterbrook and Fis-
chel note:
The corporation and its securities are products to as great an extent as the
sewing machines or other things the firm makes. Just as the founders of a
firm have incentives to make the kinds of sewing machines people want to
buy, they have incentives to create the kind of firm, governance structure,
and securities people value. The founders of the firm will find it profitable
to establish the governance structure that is most beneficial to investors, net
of the costs of maintaining the structure.
Id.
37 For a discussion of the role of friendly shareholders, see infra Part III.
38 See MIWA, supra note 6, at 202-09.
39 See Ken'ichi Imai, kigyo gurupu, in K. IMAi & R- KOMIYA, NIHON NO rIGYO 141 (1989).
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vidual products of each cooperating resource and that the resources
that the team production uses do not belong to any one individual-
applies.40 Fourth, long-term investors have the right to membership
in the organization and can recover their investment by maintaining,
rather than withdrawing, their investment in the organization. Be-
cause the skills are organization-specific, a withdrawal has the effect of
devaluing the skills achieved.
Participants are reluctant to invest in the acquisition of the requi-
site organization-specific skill when the risk of change in the incentive
system (such as pay raises and promotions) or in the basic corporate
strategy destabilizes the organizational structure. This disincentive
weakens the firm's overall performance, which in turn discourages tal-
ented young recruits from joining the firm. Uncertainty among some
participants about the organization's stability even can diminish the
aggregate value of the skills of those workers who remain confident
about the firm's future. This result can occur because the less confi-
dent workers have lower skill levels. In short, the maintenance of a
stable organizational structure is essential to ensure a competent and
efficient workforce.
In addition to large, stable shareholders who support existing
management, the stability of an organization depends on the selec-
tion of existing firm employees as directors and senior-level managers.
Even the emergence of a de facto rule of selecting directors from em-
ployee ranks can instill confidence about the organization's stability.
The reason is twofold: First, shareholders easily can remove directors
who are unfamiliar with the firm's operations or hostile to the firm's
interests. Second, a director with thirty years of experience as an em-
ployee already has made a long-term organization-specific investment
that enables him to understand the inner workings of the firm's
business.
Recall that those directors are elected at the shareholders meet-
ing, where a small group of the largest shareholders easily can take
concerted action in their own interest. Neither directors nor those
shareholders are obliged to bear or actually have any "social responsi-
bility" for stakeholders other than shareholders. The economic or-
ganization through which resource owners cooperate will make better
use of their comparative advantages to the extent that the organiza-
tion facilitates the payment of rewards based on productivity. This
applies to every resource owner. Investors, for instance, part with their
money willingly, putting it in equities rather than other investment
alternatives because they believe the returns on equities are relatively
more attractive. The same analysis holds true in determining invest-
40 See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. Rv. 777, 781-83 (1972).
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ment alternatives in the case of firms. Once owning the equity of a
firm, the investor realizes the importance of the organization's stabil-
ity and wants to be a friendly, but profitable, shareholder. Investors
can recover their investments and receive their rewards by selling
their equity. They also can decrease the risk of investment by diversi-
fying their portfolio. Neither option is feasible, however, for an em-
ployee investing in organization-specific skill.
Note two points. First, because this observation results from a
world of exchange by agreement rather than by coercion, who "con-
trols" the firm is a matter of definition. Thus, any attempt to genera-
lize an answer to such a question is futile. Therefore, my argument
that the body of employees is the controlling group is a judgement
based both on the theoretical model and on the observations shown
above and discussed below. Second, some commentators discuss a
"discretionary" power of managers of large firms and apply it to firms
in which the employees constitute the controlling group. If a return
on investment depends largely on the performance of the directors,
however, why do shareholders willingly allow directors to act contrary
to their interests?
III
THE ROLE OF DmEcTORs AND FRIENDLY SHAREHOLDERS IN
JAPANESE FIRMs
This Part discusses the two factors that enable the body of em-
ployees constituting the controlling group in most Japanese firms to
further its interests and defend itself from other stakeholders, espe-
cially company shareholders. The primary factor is that the control-
ling group generally exercises its control in a way that benefits the
other stakeholders. An additional factor is that antei-kabunushi, or
shareholders who are friendly to existing management, will reinforce
the controlling group's control by defending management against
hostile shareholders in a variety of contexts, such as takeover bids.
To illustrate some typical characteristics of the shareholdings of
large firms, consider the following data on large manufacturers of
transportation equipment-automobiles, automobile parts, ships, and
rail cars-that the Tokyo Stock Exchange lists.41 The data reveals two
points. First, a small number of shareholders own the bulk of the eq-
uity in most large Japanese firms. For example, the average concen-
tration ratio of the ten largest shareholders of eleven firms that had
more than 10,000 employees in 1990 ("Group A") was 35.03% in 1980
and 36.49% in 1990. The average ranged from as little as 26.20%
(Mitsubishi Heavy Industries) to as much as 59.50% (Isuzu) in 1990.
41 The author first analyzed this data in MiwA, supra note 6, at 202-05.
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By contrast, the corresponding figures for twenty-nine firms that had
between 2,000 and 10,000 employees in 1990 ("Group B") were
55.70% in 1980 and 54.53% in 1990.42
Second, the largest shareholders are corporations-primarily fi-
nancial institutions and trade partners. In 1990, the ten largest share-
holders in all eleven firms in Group A were corporations. In fact,
within Group A, financial institutions were the ten largest sharehold-
ers in two of the eleven firms, the nine largest shareholders in eight of
the firms, and the eight largest shareholders in one firm.
Noncorporate shareholders, including employees' shareholding as-
sociations, were among the ten largest shareholders in only three of
twenty-nine Group B firms in 1990, while an average of 7.6 financial
institutions were among the ten largest shareholders. For example, by
April 1990 all of Nissan and Honda's ten largest shareholders were
financial institutions. Even when the largest shareholder was not a
financial corporation, all of the other large shareholders often were
financial institutions. 43
Most commentators incorrectly define the term antei-kabunushi as
"stable shareholder."44 When used in the context of shareholding,
the word antei, or stable, has a dual meaning; it describes the stability
of shareholding behavior and their friendly support for the stability of
the directors.45 I prefer the translation "friendly shareholders" be-
cause I emphasize the latter meaning. Large shareholders often enjoy
stable ownership for an extended period. On average, between seven
and eight shareholders of corporations in Group A were among the
ten largest shareholders in both 1980 and 1990.46 Furthermore, most
of the large shareholders that had joined the list in 1990 were finan-
cial institutions that had been among the largest eleven to twenty
shareholders in 1980. The only two nonfinancial institutions that
were newcomers on the list of the ten largest shareholders in these
eleven Group A firms were Ford (the largest shareholder of Mazda,
holding 24%) and General Motors (the third largest shareholder of
Suzuki, with 3.6%).
The experience of Koito, a manufacturer of automobile parts,
provides a strong illustration of the stability of large shareholders. Be-
tween 1989 and 1991, Boone Pickens, a prominent American corpo-
42 See generally MrwA, supra note 6, at 202 (describing this data in more detail).
43 See id. at 202-03. For example, Ford held 24% of Mazda, Toyota held 14.19% of
Daihatsu, Nissan held 4.24% of Fuji Heavy Industries and 32.10% of Aichi Machine, and
Yamaha held 33.42% of Yamaha Motor. See id. Nine of the 10 largest shareholders of
Toyota were financial institutions. See id. The fourth largest shareholder was Toyoda Auto-
matic Loom, which held 4.35% of Toyota's total equity. See id.
44 See id. at 203.
45 See id.
46 See id.
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rate raider, attempted to acquire Koito.47 With ownership of 26.43%
of the total outstanding shares at the end of March 1990, Pickens was
Koito's largest shareholder.48 Even though the price per share rose
dramatically from 500 yen, where it had hovered for some time, to
5,470 yen on March 31, 1989,49 only three of the largest shareholders
in Koito dropped out of the list of the firm's twenty largest sharehold-
ers between March 1980 and March 1990. None of the remaining
seventeen shareholders reduced their shareholdings, and fourteen ac-
tually increased their ownership amounts. None of the three share-
holders that disappeared from the list in 1990 had been among the
ten largest shareholders in 1980. Moreover, the combined holding of
the three shareholders was only 3.24% of the total outstanding shares
in 1980. Aside from Boone Pickens, the two newcomers to the list of
the twenty largest shareholders in 1990 were mutual life insurance
companies whose combined holdings were only 2.17% of total owner-
ship. "In 1980, the ten largest shareholders had 50.78% ownership
and the twenty largest had 61.71% ownership."50
As a result of large shareholder stability, corporate leaders almost
always can expect strong support from the controlling body as long as
their actions generally comport with the employees' interests. How-
ever, the real puzzle is why shareholders remain friendly and loyal to
existing management even on rainy days? As Part II discussed, compa-
nies select their directors and managers from the employee ranks. As
long as directors and managers make decisions that are consistent
with the employees' interests, they almost always can rely on strong
support from the employees as a group.
Japanese corporate law authorizes large shareholders to remove
existing directors from their leadership positions.51 Because a small
group of few shareholders typically owns the majority of a firm's stock,
a small group of shareholders often can control the outcome of share-
holder votes, including the election of directors. 52 Despite this legal
authority and actual ability to remove directors, however, large share-
holders usually faithfully support existing management. The reason
for this loyalty is because they do not have any incentive to unite in a
movement to oust existing management that could destabilize the
firm's management.53
47 See id.
48 See id. I am unsure whether Pickens ever intended to acquire Koito. Rumors
abounded that it had been a greenmail attempt from the beginning and that Koito ulti-
mately paid Pickens secret payoffs.
49 See id.
50 Id.
51 See SH6H6, supra note 12, art. 257, para. 1.
52 See MWA, supra note 6, at 203-04.
53 See id. at 204.
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Large Japanese firms select most of their directors from their
pools of employees.54 Consider four examples from 1993. All fifty-
five directors on the board of Toyota were former employees, thirty-
one of Honda's thirty-three directors were former employees, thirty-
four of Nihon Denso's thirty-five directors were former employees,
and twenty-five of Aisin Seiki's twenty-eight directors were former em-
ployees. 55 Smaller firms in Japan reflect the same pattern. For exam-
ple, in 1993, all twenty-four directors of NOK, an automobile parts
manufacturer, were former employees. 56 Similarly, nineteen of the
twenty-one directors of Kayaba, another automobile parts manufac-
turer, were former employees.57 Both of the remaining two directors
of Kayaba were former managers of Fuji Bank, the firm's third largest
shareholder.5 8 Finally, sixteen of Koito's twenty directors were former
employees.59 Former managers of Toyota held three of the other four
seats, and a vice-president of Matsushita, the third largest shareholder
in Koito, held the remaining seat as an interlocking directorate.60
Table 1 provides the average age of directors of major Japanese
companies at the time of their appointment and the number of direc-
tors in selected firms in the years 1966, 1981, and 1996. Today, many
firms elect employees as directors who are, on average, in their early
fifties, and these directors serve for an average of six or seven years.
For example, most of Toyota's fifty-five directors in 1993 had been
elected to the board between the ages of fifty and fifty-three. Absent a
resignation, the firm promoted these directors within four years to a
senior position, such as president (shacho), vice president (fuku-
shacho), managing director (jomu), or executive managing director
(senmu). Toyota promoted twenty-three of the fifty-five directors that
sat on its board in 1993, and the shareholders selected ten new direc-
tors at their 1993 general meeting. 61 These figures are important for
three reasons. First, they suggest that shareholders of Japanese firms
select new directors annually from the pool of employees to replace
seats that outgoing board members vacate. Second, as a result of the
54 See Ronald Dore, Japan's Version of Managerial Capitalism, in TRANSFORMING ORGANI-
ZATIONS 17, 18 (Thomas A. Kochan & Michael Useem eds., 1992) ("[I)t is now extremely
rare... for a firm's CEO and any of the executive directors to be 'outsiders.'").
55 See MWA, supra note 6, at 204. The only exception in Nihon Denso involved an
interlocking directorate of the chairman of Toyota, which owned 23.07% of the equity in
Nihon Denso. The other three directors in Aishin Seiki were all from Toyota, which
owned 21.67% of the equity in Aishin Seiki and one of them-a Toyota vice president-
had an interlocking directorate. See id.
56 See id.
57 See id.
58 See id.
59 See id.
60 See id.
61 See id.
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first trend, former employees continuously dominate the board as di-
rectors. Third, large shareholders, both as individuals and together as
a unit, solidify the employee-dominated board by continually selecting
directors from the employees' ranks.
TABLE 1
AVERAGE AGE OF DIRECTOR APPoINTMENT AND THE NUMBER
OF DIRECTORS
1966
Average Number of
Age Directors
1981
Average Number of
Age Directors
1996
Average Number of
Age Directors
Panasonoic 48.6 19 54 29 54.9 32
SONY 44.3 14 48.6 27 52.8 38
Hitachi 52.5 20 55 25 55.7 33
Toyota 45.6 18 50 35 52 55
Honda 43.3 11 46.7 32 49.6 35
Fuji Bank 48.2 19 50.3 30 50.6 36
Industrial Bank
ofJapan 48.2 19 51 34 51.5 37
Nomura Securities 42.8 33 44.5 40 45.7 43
Tokyo Electric 56 20 55.5 28 57.3 32
SouRcE: Yoshiro Miwa, torishimariyaku-kai to torishimariyaku [The Board of Directors and Its Members],
in 1AISHA-HO NO KEIZAIGAKU [THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW] (Yoshiro Miwa et al. eds.,
1998).
Figure 1 provides the average number of board members in five major
Japanese automobile producers from the years 1960 to 1996. It also
categorizes the directors into a hierarchy of several ranks that is usu-
ally based on seniority. Lower ranking directors, such as department
chiefs, tend to be salaried employees, although Japanese corporate
culture tends to consider these salaried employees on a higher rung
of the corporate ladder than other categories of salaried employees.
This pattern is very similar in other industries regardless of whether
they are rapid-growth industries or those experiencing slow growth or
decline.62
IV
WHY FRIENDLY SHAREHOLDERS REmAiN FRIENDLY
The body of employees can maintain stability and insulate itself
from attack by other stakeholders because an attack against it usually
will not benefit the other stakeholders. In addition, the existence of
friendly shareholders bolsters the employees' stable position as the
firm's controlling group. This situation leads us to consider again why
friendly shareholders remain friendly. In a market in which agree-
62 See Yoshiro Miwa, torishimariyaku-kai to torishimariyaku, in Miwa et al., supra note 28,
at 89.
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FiGuRE I
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ment and cooperation govern, shareholders remain friendly because
the anticipated rewards that their friendliness will create are greater
than the benefits that a hostile relationship will confer.
To win the support of shareholders, however, the controlling
group must deliver rewards that are large enough to attract suppliers
of resources. To ensure large stakeholders remain friendly, the con-
trolling group not only must avoid making management decisions
that conflict with the interests of all shareholders, but also must pro-
vide incentives beyond those offered to ordinary shareholders. Short
of these measures, investors who are pessimistic about the firm's pros-
pects will turn hostile or sell off their stocks.
Many Japanese firms employ three specific types of incentives to
maintain the support of large shareholders. 63 The first type of incen-
tive is the cross-holding of equity, an option that can protect the stabil-
ity of both organizations by providing mutual benefits to friendly
shareholders of both firms.64 A second incentive that Japanese firms
frequently use is cross benefits between trading partners.65 Because a
63 For a comprehensive discussion of these incentives, see MIWA, supra note 6, at 207-
09.
64 See id. at 207.
65 See id.
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business's success is a function of its stability, a firm can increase its
profits by bolstering its stability. In turn, the firm can provide its buy-
ers with better products at more competitive prices.66 Conversely, the
buyers have an interest in increasing the seller's stability because
greater seller stability serves as a guarantee that its supply of products
will not cease either at the supplier's will or as the result of forces
beyond the seller's control, such as a hostile takeover by a competitor
of the seller or the buyer. In short, both companies profit from a
cross-benefit relationship.
A third incentive that many Japanese businesses provide is the
distribution of lucrative business opportunities to the firm's buyers
and sellers. 67 Mutual insurance companies (some of which are the
largest shareholders in Japan) provide a good example of companies
that benefit from this type of incentive. These insurance companies
cannot take advantage of cross sharing because of their noncorporate
status. 68 In most cases, these firms are neither large "purchasers of
the manufacturing firms [that] they own nor do they have much inter-
est in the stability of the manufacturing firm [s'] organization. '69 Yet
these insurance companies engage in both loan transactions and in-
surer-customer relationships with their shareholding firms.
To summarize, I argue that the body of employees in most Japa-
nese firms has the implied authority to select both friendly sharehold-
ers and the source of corporate funds (e.g., banks). My argument
leads to three conclusions about corporate governance in large Japa-
nese firms that conflict with the conventional view of the Japanese
economy. First, the friendly shareholders are selected because they
are supposed to be friendly to the present directors and managers.
When once friendly large shareholders threaten the present manage-
ment, the directors change their selection of the friendly sharehold-
ers. Cross-holdings or group holdings (for example, among
"corporate group" firms) 70 are the result of such voluntary selection.
Second, firms select lenders who are willing to support the incumbent
board. The directors, therefore, will seek new sources of funding
whenever the firm's current friendly lenders turn hostile toward the
66 See id.
67 See id.
68 See j&d
69 Id.
70 Here readers might remember popularJapanese "corporate group" or keiretsu talks,
most of which, however, are based on misconceptions and are flatly false. See id. at 123-41.
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current management.71 This voluntary selection explains why the
largest lender usually has a large share of the borrower's stock.72
Third, present directors and employees try to select other direc-
tors and senior managers who will support them. Even directors who
clearly favor the interests of other stakeholders remain friendly to the
present body of directors as a result of this voluntary selection. Once
the body of employees secures its position as the controlling group,
large shareholders cannot unite to oust the incumbent management
that the employees strongly support without great expense. 73 The
controlling group will oppose vigorously any new management that
seeks to revise the nature of the organization or its policy, whether the
new management team is selected externally or internally. The rea-
son for this opposition is that, first, the accumulated human capital is
organization-specific, and second, the availability of management per-
sonnel from outside of the firm that can improve the firm's perform-
ance is limited. Even when a bank that owns a large share of firm X's
equity appoints its own manager as the president of firm X it is un-
likely that any significant improvement will result. New directors can
improve a company's policies only when they have the employees'
support. Thus, the appointment of an outsider as a director usually
does not improve a firm's performance.
71 Anyone who is familiar with the popular Japanese main bank argument, see id. at
100-22, may question the connection between my argument and the traditional role of
main banks. Ronald Dore describes the Japanese main bank system as follows:
One of the banks is generally considered a firm's lead bank. It may provide
only marginally more loan capital than other banks, but it will own more of
the firm's equity, it will put more effort into monitoring the company's
performance, and it will be the prime mover in any brink-of-bankruptcy
reconstructions.
Dore, supra note 54, at 20 (citation omitted). Supporters of the traditional view often
suggest that the lead bank, usually called the "main bank," has significant control over the
borrower's management. If this is so, however, then why does the controlling group con-
tinue to choose a certain main bank? As I have expressed elsewhere, I am quite skeptical
of the recent flood of literature on the Japanese main bank system that implicitly assumes
that a tight cartel exists among Japanese financial institutions and dominates the nation's
capital market. See MwA, supra note 6, at 224 ("A widely held misconception is that be-
cause of the closely connected network of inter-firm relationships, called keiretsu, competi-
tive markets exist in a strictly limited area in Japan."). Given that main banks often
withdraw before borrowers face financial turmoil, it is irrational for non-main bank lend-
ers to reduce their monitoring costs by delegating the oversight function to main banks.
Thus, if a main bank really does have superior monitoring capabilities and better knowl-
edge of the borrower's financial statements than other banks, then why does it not take
advantage of its stronger positioning by withdrawing?
72 See MrwA, supra note 6, at 209.
73 See Dore, supra note 54, at 21 ("[A] ttempts to mount a hostile takeover are rare.").
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V
PossIBL MECHANISMS FOR IMPLEMENTING CORPORATE
SocrAL RESPONSIBILrIY
Ever since Adam Smith wrote The Wealth of Nations,74 commenta-
tors have focused a great deal of attention on the separation of owner-
ship from management and the separation of management from
control. Berle and Means further provoked the public's interest in
the firm's form of social control in The Modern Corporation and Private
Property, where they concluded that "[o]wnership of wealth without
appreciable control and control of wealth without appreciable owner-
ship appear to be the logical outcome of corporate development."75
This argument has prevailed in postwar Japan, and many commenta-
tors insist that the separation is greater in Japan than in the United
States. 76
The traditional view of management is that the ownership inter-
est of each shareholder is so small that the cost of uniting is prohibi-
tive and thereby limits the effective control of management. This
Article, however, presents a different view of the separation of owner-
ship and management. When a small number of shareholders own
the majority of the equity in a firm, the cost of uniting is not as high.
Those shareholders usually are friendly to the incumbent manage-
ment because being so is more advantageous than trying to manage
the firm on their own or searching for a replacement management
team. Thus, the separation of ownership from management and the
separation of management from control in Japanese firms do not cre-
ate a serious social problem. 77
Before discussing whether we should require corporations and
their directors to bear "social responsibility," it is worthwhile to con-
74 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
(Edwin Carman ed., The Modem Library 1937) (1776).
75 ADoL A. BERLE,JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 69 (1932).
76 See MnvA, supra note 6, at 210.
77 See id, Although my analysis focuses on large firms such as those listed on the
Japanese stock exchanges, the same logic also applies to both large and small unlisted
firms:
What would happen if an owner of a large unlisted firm, where the body of
employees is the controlling group, made a decision against the interests of
this group, for instance suggesting selling the organization to some other
firm in ten years? Such a firm can neither attract young talent nor induce
employees to invest in organization-specific skill formation, resulting in the
firm's poor performance. Thus an owner-manager chooses to be friendly
to the body of employees, and the non-separation, or non-dispersion, of
ownership does not affect the firm's basic decisions. The same holds true
for small businesses. In order to survive and grow, even an owner-manager
of a small business has to follow the same path.
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sider four possible mechanisms for enforcing such a rule. First, we
could encourage directors to make socially conscious decisions. How-
ever, a corporate "social responsibility" regime that relies on mere
persuasion and voluntary assumption of this obligation by business
leaders would have only a limited effect. Moreover, if some firms were
to take "social responsibility" but others did not, then this enforce-
ment mechanism would disadvantage those who acted responsibly
and confer a significant market advantage on those who did not.
Thus, a system that relied exclusively on persuasion to enforce corpo-
rate "social responsibility" could never succeed.
Second, the law could mandate that corporate directors make
specific socially conscious decisions, such as donating a certain per-
centage of a firm's income to charity. This enforcement mechanism,
however, lacks any logical means by which the legislature can define
the parameters of such a legal requirement. For example, should it
require firms to contribute to educational, academic, or religious or-
ganizations? In addition, society might benefit more if the govern-
ment were to collect and then distribute a social tax instead of leaving
allocation decisions to the discretion of self-selected private individu-
als. As one commentator has asked, "Is it tolerable that these public
functions of taxation, expenditure, and control be exercised by the
people who happen at the moment to be in charge of particular enter-
prises, chosen for those posts by strictly private groups?"7 8
Third, the law could prohibit shareholders from filing derivative
suits that challenge decisions directors make with "social responsibil-
ity" in mind. This alternative, however, also raises several troubling
questions. For instance, which challenges would we eliminate?
Would we modify the business judgment rule? Could shareholders
contract around this prohibition?79 Moreover, even if we could re-
solve these problems, given that shareholders set the directors' com-
pensation and can remove them, directors rarely will take action that
is contrary to the shareholders' interest.
78 FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 134.
79 See Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory
Corporate Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1599, 1599-1601 (1989). Professor Romano notes:
The rules that are identified as "mandatory" in practice have very little in
common with the ordinary understanding of that term. They are either
easily-and legally-side stepped, or they pose nonbinding constraints be-
cause there is no burning demand to deviate from them.
The history of corporation codes suggests that when a mandatory
rule's constraint becomes binding (that is, when a sufficient number of
firms desire to deviate from the rule), then the code is invariably revamped
in the direction of less restrictive (more optional) terms.
Id. at 1599-1601 (footnote omitted).
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Finally, the law could curtail shareholder discretion in the elec-
tion of directors by restricting the pool of candidates. Such a mea-
sure, however, would reduce the anticipated rate of return of an
investment in a firm, which in turn would discourage investments in
companies and distort the allocation of resources in the economy.80
A general concern with "social responsibility" is that all four of
these enforcement mechanisms would create an economic distortion
if enforcement targets firms in the public spotlight, such as public
utility, telecommunication, transportation, distribution, and financial
companies. Inconsistent enforcement would enable smaller firms not
under public scrutiny to act less responsibly, giving them a market
advantage over larger, more prominent firms that face greater pres-
sure to act in a socially conscious manner.
Thus, any requirement that corporate leaders bear "social respon-
sibility" would diminish society's aggregate wealth in proportion to
the intensity of enforcement: the stricter and broader the enforce-
ment efforts, the greater the decrease in overall wealth. Moreover,
even if corporate "social responsibility" did not alter corporate behav-
ior, the resulting atmosphere steadily would undermine the founda-
tions of our free market. The entire social system would lose its
stability, and Japan would return to the atmosphere that existed
before and during World War H. Section VI addresses this potential
outcome and illustrates why it could develop in any society.
VI
CAN A CoRPoRATE SociAL REsPoNSIBILY REGiME EVEN
AcHmVE ITS' GoALs?
Even if we were to agree that the law should require corporate
officers to behave in a socially responsible way and that this obligation
should trump their duty to maximize shareholders' interests, many
questions would remain unresolved. For example, precisely how
should corporate officials fulfill this duty? Who should define the pre-
cise requirements? How should society implement and enforce these
requirements? How, and by whom, should a failure to fulfill this obli-
gation be punished? In addition, society would have to bear the po-
tentially great economic costs associated with imposing a social duty
on corporate officials.
80 SeeJoHN KAY, THE BusINEss OF ECONOMICS 118 (1996). Kay notes:
Any governance structure-political or corporate, democratic or authorita-
rian, American orJapanese-has a natural tendency to embrace those who
share the basic values of those who currently operate it, and to reject those
who do not. Moreover, such behaviour is easy to defend; is it not better to
confine involvement to those who understand the business?
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The anticipated benefits that society would derive from a socially
conscious corporate regime simply do not justify our acceptance of
these drawbacks. Corporate social responsibility could have a poten-
tially negative impact on the efficient allocation of resources.
Whether consciously or unconsciously, consumers in a free market di-
rect their resources toward firms that they regard as the best places to
spend their money. Therefore, the controlling group of firms must
deliver rewards that are large enough to attract investors. Market
forces require the controlling group to act with the interests of every
other resource owner in mind. It is as if, as Adam Smith wrote, the
controlling group is "led by an invisible hand to promote an end
which was no part of [its] ... intention."8 '
Even if imposing a social duty on corporate officials strengthened
the relative status of the controlling group, no apparent justification
for strengthening their status exists. Consider the reason that other
stakeholders usually support the firm's employees as the controlling
group.82 To survive and expand, a firm must accumulate a stock of
human capital, a process that requires time and some measure of con-
fidence that the firm's human capital will not devalue drastically in
the foreseeable future.8 3 The resulting stability enables employees to
maximize the use of their resources.8 4 Japanese firms always have per-
formed this accumulation process without any explicit emphasis on
social responsibility or governmental intervention.
The prevailing view, however, is that Japanese corporate law
should decrease rather than elevate the status of employees. Many
commentators argue that directors who are former employees are so
successful at winning the support of the antei-kabunushi that share-
holder meetings have become keigaika, or only ceremonial (a mere
shell). In addition, commentators accuse management of according
the interests of shareholders too little weight.85 Another popular view
is that because Japanese firms in the 1990s suffer from over-stability,
they should restructure themselves to increase their flexibility and
mobility.8 6
81 SMrrH, supra note 74, at 421. Note that minority shareholders do not vote for the
decisions at shareholder meetings. Moreover, some shareholders vote only because it is
the best choice given the constraints under the majority's decision-making power.
82 See supra Part HI.
83 See M1WA, supra note 6, at 205-06 (discussing the process thatJapanese companies
use to accumulate human capital).
84 See id. at 206.
85 See id. at 199-200. This popular argument is not peculiar to Japan. For a discussion
on the internationally widespread demand for greater shareholder rights, see the many
articles in CoRoRAT GoERNANCE TODAY (The Sloan Project on Corporate Governance at
Columbia Law School, May 1998).
86 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and Commer-
cial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States, 48 STAN. L.
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The corporate social responsibility argument raises similarly
troubling conclusions with regard to trading partners. Trading part-
ners are stakeholders that often profit from imposing greater corpo-
rate social responsibility. Contrary to the misinformed conventional
wisdom about trade relationships, 87 trade relationships in Japan are
generally not exclusive. They are, however, generally long-term. A
social-responsibility regime apparently would elevate the status of
trade partners and strengthen the stability of the trade relationships
that some critics, calling them keiretsu, regard as overly stable. The
prevailing view in Japan favors decreased stability of trading partners.
The arguments that proponents of corporate social accountability of-
fer to bolster their position lack detail and reflect only general opposi-
tion to the free market. Because many other publications have
thoroughly criticized the social responsibility position,88 it is unneces-
sary to discuss this point in greater detail. The next Part returns to
the Japanese experience.
VII
REWARDS TO THE SHAREHOLDERS AS THE
RESIDuAL CLAiANTs
Proponents of corporate social responsibility insist that it is ineq-
uitable to give shareholders sole authority to elect corporate directors.
Despite the potential efficiency of this present structure, opponents
argue that it confers an unfair privilege on the shareholders.8 9 My
discussion of the Japanese shareholders' experience begins with a sim-
ple observation that symbolizes their status: although shareholders
can vote to liquidate the firm and divide its residual value among
REv. 73, 100 (1995) ("[T]he core purpose of the ... Japanese corporate governance sys-
tem[ ] has been to produce stability .... But there is growing evidence that this kind of
stability is not a virtue today, with global competition and rapid technological innovation
placing a far higher premium on... flexibility.... ."). Note that I express no opinion with
respect to labor-managed firms. Cf. MnvA, supra note 6, at 212 ("Employees are a collec-
tion of different groups of workers, and one group of workers or a collection of groups of
workers form the controlling group."). I do not mean to suggest "that employees in a firm
are strongly united and form the controlling group as a whole." Id.
87 For example, keiretsu often is poorly defined. See MIWA, supra note 6, at 33.
88 See, e.g., FRiEDMAN, supra note 1, at 133-36; Macey & Miller, supra note 3, at 401-05;
see also Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treat-
ment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DuKE L.J. 173, 173-76 (arguing that "the private
contracting process" better fortifies nonshareholder constituencies than governmental
regulation).
89 See, e.g., David Millen, New Directions in Corporate Law Communications, Contractarians,
and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1373, 1384 (1993). InJapan, observ-
ers who emphasize "fairness" and "equity" often challenge the majority's decision-making
power at shareholder meetings. But investors, lenders, trade partners, and workers have
very different incentives and goals. To ignore these differences and request the equal
treatment of these resource suppliers surely undermines the foundation of Japanese soci-
ety. Whether this point applies to countries other than Japan is another question entirely.
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themselves, not one company listed on a Japanese stock exchange, to
my knowledge, has ever distributed positive dividends in this way.90 As
I have noted previously,
[L]arge firms usually do not increase dividend payment even when
there are large profits. Instead, firms expand retained earnings and
reinvest this profit into the organization mainly for the employees'
benefit. Over a long periods of boom and depression, other stake-
holders have stayed friendly unless circumstances change. For in-
stance, with stable dividend payment of only 5 yen a year per share,
many shareholders remain friendly. Banks which are sure to re-
cover their loan principal and promised interest payments will con-
tinue to support existing management. Once-prosperous firms,
such as Toyobo, Toray, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Nippon
Steel, are the notable examples. For instance, Toray earned large
profits in the 1960s when it enjoyed a monopoly in nylon produc-
tion and was one of the pioneering suppliers of polyester. However,
Toray's dividends increased slowly, reaching their peak at 8 yen per
share per annum in FY 1969. Dividends soon decreased to around 5
yen per year.91
During prosperous periods, many large Japanese firms plan for
future economic stagnation by diversifying and spending large
amounts of retained profits to recruit desirable employees.9 2 Most
firms avoid mergers and acquisitions as a means of diversifying be-
cause they want to expand the employee's workplace, not only gener-
ate profits.9 3 Besides diversification, some large firms also pay
additional salary to employees who technically remain employees but
in fact no longer work at the firm.9 4 Although these employees find
work at other firms, they usually face pay cuts because their organiza-
tion-specific skills are essentially useless outside of their home compa-
nies.9 5 Former employers, however, must compensate their
employees for the lost compensation.96 As a result, relatively few lay-
offs in large firms followed the recent period of serious economic de-
cline in Japan.9 7 Thus, even in times of economic hardship,
90 Arguably, because Japanese corporate law assigns the residual claim to sharehold-
ers, it is shareholders who control the firm. As Ryutaro Komiya has argued, however,
"[i]rrespective of legal definitions of rights and responsibilities, ownership of the firm, in
an economic sense, is not easily defined. 'Ownership' is not a black-and-white affair .... "
RyUTARo KOMiVA, THE JAPANESE ECONOMY. TRADE, INDUSTRY, AND GOvERNMENT 168-69
(1990).
91 MIWA, supra note 6, at 211.
92 See id.
93 See id.
94 See id.
95 See id.
96 See id,.
97 See id.
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employers are not sacrificing employee interests to satisfy
shareholders.
Consider, for example, the experience of Nippon Steel, Japan's
largest steel manufacturer. In 1993, more than 15,000 employees, or
approximately thirty percent of the firm's total workforce, worked
outside of the firm.98 Nippon Steel must compensate these "outside"
employees until they reach the retirement age of sixty;99 yet despite
this economic burden and the company's battle with serious debt,
Nippon Steel continued to pay its shareholders annual dividends of
2.5 yen per share.'00 Even some of the largest debt-ridden steel manu-
facturers that have stopped paying dividends have continued to pay
the additional salary to their employees who work outside the firm.' 0 '
These examples illustrate the relatively weak position that sharehold-
ers occupy in the Japanese corporate structure. They are powerless
against directors who compensate "outside" employees, even when
those additional salary payments lead the firm to withhold dividend
payments.
The experience of NKK, Japan's second largest steel manufac-
turer, provides another example of the position of shareholders in
Japan. On September 3, 1998, NKK announced its plan to liquidate a
subsidiary, Toa Steel, that employed 1400 workers and reported an-
nual sales of 130 billion yen at the end of March 1999.102 NKK stated
that it would create a receiving company that would assume all of the
subsidiary's assets, debts, and employees.' 03 By the end of March
1998, NKK held 51.58% of Toa, a debt-ridden firm that had not paid
dividends to its shareholders. 0 4 In February 1998, when the price of
Toa's shares had reached more than one hundred yen per share, NKK
made a capital contribution of 5.2 billion yen that increased its equity
holding share by 36.54% to the current level.10 5 According to some
reports, NKK will acquire from Toa a total of 250 billion yen in
debt.10 6 Although NKK shareholders recently received annual divi-
dends of 2.5 yen per share, the firm authorized those payments only
after an extended period with no dividend payments. Toa's share-
holders lost their entire investments as a result of the liquidation.
98 See i& This figure exceeded 10,000 from 1989 until recently. See id.
99 See id.
100 See id.
101 See id.
102 See Toa Steel Out of Options, To Liquidate Itself March 31, Ju' PREss TIcKER SERVICE,
Sept. 3, 1998.
103 See NKK Confirms, Toa Steel To Go into Liquidation, AFX NEvs, Sept. 3, 1998.
104 See Sandra Sugawara, In Japan, New Trouble Signs: Toa Steel Co. Becomes Historic Fail-
ure: Hitachi Predicts $1.8 Billion Annual Loss, WAsH. Posr, Sept. 4, 1998, at El; Debt-Ridden
Japan's Toa Steel Facing Liquidation, AsIA PULSE, Sept. 3, 1998.
105 See Sugawara, supra note 104.
106 See Toa Steel Out of Options, To Liquidate Itself March 31, supra note 102.
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VIII
ASSESSING THE SocIA.L RESPONSIBILITY ARGUMENT IN LIGHT
OF THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE
Historically, support for the corporate social responsibility argu-
ment has been much stronger in Japan than in the United States.
This trend reflects the Germanic and Marxist economic theory that
dominated economic discussions in Japan from the turn of the cen-
tury until the 1970s.10 7 Marxist theory influenced academics in a wide
range of disciplines as well as journalists, politicians, lawyers, and bu-
reaucrats. 108 In fact, the notion thatJapanese corporate responsibility
extends beyond the shareholders was so widespread in the prewar pe-
riod that virtually no one asserted the opposite view. The popularity
of this position has provided the greatest obstacle to the deregulation
that recently began to accelerate in Japan. 0 9 Much like a dormant
volcano that threatens to erupt at any moment, the widespread sup-
port for this outdated view is dangerous.
As I have observed elsewhere, "it is only recently that many econo-
mists have begun to talk about the Japanese economy using the stan-
dard principles of economics" and have applied them to explain the
"dominant patterns of the Japanese economic phenomena."110 Be-
cause of the dominance of Marxist theory, until very recently, support
for open and free competition led by an invisible hand has been weak
in Japan. Those who subscribed to such theories failed to recognize
that the economic phenomena could have occurred as a result of ex-
change by agreement, not by coercion."' Marxian theories perme-
ated not only academia and various fields of social science, but also
politics, the legal profession, government, and the media.112 Business
leaders also espoused Marxist views when they discussed the overall
Japanese economy.113 Indeed, "Marxian theories have become so in-
grained [in Japanese society] that they still permeate the conventional
view of the Japanese economy," 1 4 leaving little room for support of
free competition.115
Not only did much of the public distrust the free market and fear
unfettered competition, but Japan experienced intermittent revivals
of Marxist ideology. Bolstered by these fears, the Japanese govern-
107 See MiWA, supra note 6, at 2.
108 See id.
109 See YOSHIRO MIWA, KISEI KANWA HA AKUMU DESUKA? [Is DEREGULATION A
NIGHTMARE?] 22-68 (1997).
110 MnWA, supra note 6, at 2.
111 See id.
112 See id.
113 See id.
114 Id.
115 See id.
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ment has imposed strict regulations on large sections of the economy,
including the energy, finance, telecommunications, and transporta-
tion sectors. 116 Because the remarkable postwar industrial success in
Japan was the product of free and open competition, however, public
support of Marxist theory gradually has eroded in recent years." 7
Nevertheless, Marxist economic thought is so deeply embedded in
Japanese society that the slightest stimulus could trigger an explosive
resurgence.
In this light, the open debate over the value of corporate social
responsibility remains both dangerous and potentially useful. On the
one hand, it is dangerous and harmful because even a slight stimulus
could disrupt the current stability and increase the popularity of the
social-responsibility view. On the other hand, as long as the economy
remains stable, the debate provides a valuable opportunity to educate
the public on the drawbacks of a social-responsibility regime. In addi-
tion, the debate serves as an outlet for the energy that feeds on the
distrust and criticism of the free market. Therefore, the social-respon-
sibility debate is beneficial as long as both camps conclude that corpo-
rate directors owe a fiduciary duty only to the shareholders.
Japan experienced the greatest proliferation of Marxist ideology
when the nation was under governmental control before and during
World War H. Beginning with sangyo gohrika undo (the industrial ra-
tionalization movement), which was symbolized by the establishment
of Rinji Sangyo Gohri-kyoku (the temporary industrial rationalization
agency),"18 the government gradually expanded its involvement in the
116 See id. at 14 (stating that "government influence is strong in regulated industries
like energy, transport, communications, financial intermediations and agriculture").
117 Some readers might share Paul Krugman's erroneous belief that "before the early
1970s the Japanese system was heavily directed from the top, with MITI and the Ministry of
Finance influencing the allocation of credit and foreign exchange in an effort to push the
economy where they liked." PAUL KRUGMAN, THE AGE OF DIMINISHED EXPECrATIONS: U.S.
ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1990s 142 (rev. & updated ed. 1994). ManyJapanese also agree
that the Industry Stabilization Act of 1978 and the Structural Improvement Act of 1983,
both policies for "competition control" and "planned resource allocation," were what the
government inherited from the wartime plan-and-control system. The postwar industrial
policy differs from the wartime control in two regards. First, the objective is economic
independence and economic growth rather than wartime mobilization. Second, the policy
implementation system is a decentralized inducing system with diversified soft-type meth-
ods rather than a command-control system, making excessive competition visible. See Tet-
suji Okazaki & Masashiro Okuno-Fujiwara, gendai nihon no keizai shisutemu to sono genryu
[Economic System in Today's Japan and the Historical Origin], in GENDAI NIHON KEIZAI
SHISUTEMU NO GENRYU [THE ORIGIN OF ECONOMIC SYSTEM IN TODAY's JAPAN] 1, 12 (Tetsuji
Okazaki & Masashiro Okuno-Fujiwara eds., 1993). These views are clearly mistaken. See
YOSHIRO MIWA, SEIFU NO NORYOKU [THE COMPETENCE OF THE STATE] 117-217 (1998). The
government could not and did not achieve very much through intervention in private busi-
ness, either during wartime control or in the postwar Japan before the early 1970s.
118 See MIwA, supra note 117, at 147-48. From June 2, 1930 until April 30, 1937, the
commerce minister headed the Temporary Industrial Rationalization Agency, which was
established to lead and oversee the movement.
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private sector as the war progressed." 9 The intervention steadily in-
creased until the government strictly controlled nearly every form of
business activity. For example, the government dictated entry into the
market and investment and denied profit incentives. In response,
some business leaders argued that governmental interference in the
free market would undermine military production, and they attribute
the serious inefficiency and weakness of Japan's wartime economy in
part to the poorly organized governmental intervention that discour-
aged business incentives.120
Japan's postwar industrial success reached its pinnacle during the
second postwar decade, following ten years of recovery from the war-
time destruction. During this prosperity, the government imple-
mented a series of "liberalizations.' 121 The most pressing policy issue
of the period, known as the industrial-order debate, involved the
proper role of the government in the market economy. The contro-
versy peaked when the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
proposed the Act on Temporary Measures for the Promotion of Speci-
fied Manufacturing Industries to the Diet. Support for the act, which
sought to preserve the "industrial order" by authorizing governmental
intervention in the private sector, derived from the public's fear of
competition, distrust of the market, and faith in the government. Af-
ter the attempt failed, a long-term trend toward more open and free
markets accelerated. 122 Thus, Japan's remarkable industrial success
occurred not because of effective industrial policy set by the govern-
ment, but because of an open and free market.
At the outset of the 1990s, Japanese business leaders began to
stress kyosei, or symbiosis, as an ideal for which both society and busi-
ness should strive.123 Japanese people often attribute the word to the
late Akio Morita, a former SONY chairman and vice-chairman of
Keidanren, or the Federation of Trade Associations in Japan.124 As a
spokesperson for the Japanese business community, Morita enthusias-
119 See Alex Y. Seito & Jiro Tamura, The Historical Background of Japan's Antimonopoly
Law, 1994 U. ILL. L. Ruv. 115, 137 (stating that "Japan's wartime conditions led to greater
governmental control of competition-primarily through governmentally enforced car-
tels-with the principal objective of maximizing military potential").
120 Another question is whether better organization could have made the govern-
ment's wartime intervention in the private sector more effective. For a negative answer to
this question, see MwA, supra note 117, at 1-113.
121 See MnwA, supra note 6, at 12-13 (describing the Japanese government's 1961 adop-
tion of the Outline of the Plan for Trade and Foreign Exchange Liberalization). Among
other things, this plan called for the government to increase the "trade liberalization rate"
from 40% in 1961 to 80% by 1963. See id.
122 See MrwA, supra note 6, at 151, 156.
123 See Clay Chandler, Japan Inc. Tries To Push New Credo, but 'Kyosei' Concept Is Lost on
Many, AsiAN WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 1992, § 1, at 7; Akio Morita, "nihon-teki keiei" ga abunai
[Danger to the 7Japanese Management'], BUNGEI SHUju, Feb. 1992, at 94.
124 See Chandler, supra note 123.
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tically argued thatJapanese firms needed to focus less on competition
with non-Japanese firms and instead develop novel ways to coexist
with them in the world market.125 The business community immedi-
ately embraced the strategy, even though its substance was quite simi-
lar to the traditional cartelization and industry control doctrine.
Because it resonated with now-dormant traditional Marxist thought,
kyosei struck a responsive public chord, especially among older busi-
nessmen, 126 politicians, and journalists; 2 7 it became one of the most
popular phrases of the era.' 28
The 1990s in Japan essentially has been a period of deregulation.
The ongoing recession and financial chaos, however, are fostering a
revival of interventionist sentiments. As a result, the dormant volcano
of interventionism is beginning to rumble. The public and the mass
media increasingly are demanding that the government intervene in
the private sector by imposing a social duty on corporate directors,
particularly financial institutions. These cries for governmental inter-
vention represent, in substance, a rebirth of the interventionist move-
ment that a similar combination of confidence in the government and
distrust of the market triggered in the postwar era.
CONCLUSION
This Article argues that advocates of the corporate social respon-
sibility position have too little confidence in the free market and ex-
cessive confidence in the competence of the government. We must
question the value of governmental intervention in the market much
more critically and thoroughly than the proponents of corporate so-
cial responsibility. After observing that "the adoption of a mandatory
rule is as likely to do harm as good," Professor Hart warned that
"mandatory rules are probably a mistake." 29 If we apply his admoni-
tion to corporate social responsibility, the conclusion is clear: requir-
ing corporate officials to bear social responsibility for their business
decisions would be a mistake.
125 See Paul Blustein, Japan Gets a Hard Look from Within; Leaders Talk of Softening Unique
Style of Capitalism, WAsH. PosT, Oct. 18, 1992, at Hi.
126 Fujio Mitarai, Canon's President, recently remarked that "'whether in Japan or
overseas, we want to contribute to society, and also be a good corporate citizen. That's the
concept of kyosei.'" Canon LookingAhead, Naw STRAGHTs TiMEs (Malaysia), Sept. 25, 1997,
at 26.
127 See Ikuya Shigeta, Economic Perspective DArLYYoMIuPi, Mar. 9, 1992, at 8 (stating that
"the sooner the captains of Japanese industry respond Kaidanren's plea for 'Kyosei,' the
better").
128 SeeMorita, supra note 123. For a critical analysis of this article, see MwA, supra note
109, at 185-94.
129 Oliver Hart, An Economist's View of Fiduciary Duty, 43 U. ToRoNTo Lj. 299, 313
(1993).
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The risk that markets might fail could lead to "arguments for and
against a narrow interpretation of fiduciary duty."' 30 The simple fact
that markets sometimes fail, however, does not mean that we should
'Jump out of the market frying pan."' 3 ' Responding with such a hasty
action would be foolish because "we have no basis for predicting
whether [we] . . . will land in the fire or a luxurious bed."13 2
In the 1964 presidential address to the American Economic Asso-
ciation, Professor Stigler characterized Adam Smith's distrust of gov-
ernmental intervention as a distrust of the state's motives and not as a
doubt about its competence. 133 Professor Stigler then suggested that
Smith had based his views on the unsupported assumption that the
government has the ability to achieve undesirable goals with effi-
ciency.'34 Indeed, Smith dismissed inept governmental conduct and
offered no persuasive evidence that the government can accomplish
any of its policy objectives. The economic experience of the last de-
cades as well as research that economists have conducted since Stigler
delivered his remarks suggest that the public has been too optimistic
about the government's ability to intervene effectively in the open
market.135
Although this analysis focuses on Japanese firms, the conclusions
apply to firms around the globe. The underlying premise of my argu-
ment-that the fundamental factor that determines the form, charac-
ter, and operation of any organization is organization-specific human
capital found in the body of employees-is technological in nature.
Therefore, my analysis is not peculiar to any one country, and any
crucial differences that exist between markets are not the product of
differences in the basic structure that would render this analysis
inapplicable.
130 Id.
131 GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE 113 (1975).
132 Id.
133 See George J. Stigler, The Economist and the State, 55 Am. ECON. Rxv. 1, 3 (1965).
134 See id.
135 For the Japanese experience, see MnvA, supra note 117.
1254 [Vol. 84:1227
